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Space Becomes a Contested Domain
It is no coincidence that NATO adopted its first dedicated 
space strategy in June 2019 and is considering to desig-
nate space as a domain of its own, equal to land, air, sea 
and cyberspace.1 The latest reminder that space is turn-
ing into a military-operational environment came on 27 
March 2019, when India performed a military feat that 
only the USA, Russia, and China had achieved before: It 
hit and destroyed a satellite orbiting Earth by means of 
a missile.2 Meanwhile, the USA is considering to create 
a space force and, more worryingly, planning to station 
weapons in space.3 France, again, is aiming to set up a 
space command as part of its air force in September this 
year.4
With the growing importance of space assets for 
military and civilian functions, space is also gaining 
strategic importance and features ever more prominently 
in military debates. A high military value of space assets 
increases the incentive for states to be able to attack an 
adversary’s space assets and protect their own. To date, 
space has only been militarized: This means, space assets 
have been used for military purposes such as intelligence 
gathering and early warning. Now, however, space is on 
the brink of getting weaponized, and this will involve the 
deployment of weapons in space that can engage other 
space assets or even targets on Earth. 
All these developments decrease the strategic and 
crisis stability among states. To address the changing 
security landscape in space, Germany should follow a 
two-fold approach: First, it should seek to develop new, 
and support existing arms control and non-proliferation 
regimes, especially in cooperation with its European 
allies. Second, it should work within NATO to designate 
space as a military-operational domain of its own and 
strengthen the alliance’s capabilities and procedures 
regarding space.
The Infrastructure for Military and Civilian 
Space Activities
Space activities, both military and civilian, require the 
following infrastructure: first, the space asset itself, i.e. 
the satellite; second, the communication infrastructure, 
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i.e. the data links to send and receive information to 
and from space assets; third, launch systems that take 
the assets into space, and fourth, capabilities for space 
situational awareness (SSA) to minimize the risk of col-
lisions in space. Altogether, the required technological 
infrastructure is very costly and technically demanding, 
certainly when compared to activities in aviation. How-
ever, the costs for the parts that make up the space infra-
structure have been decreasing as a result of continuous 
innovation, and this is opening space activities up to more 
actors than ever before.
The Opening of Space
For most of its 60 years, human spaceflight was limited 
to a few technologically advanced countries, above all 
the USA and the former Soviet Union, which were able 
to develop, produce and maintain the complex space 
infrastructure required. Their competition for prestige 
and technological advances, which became known as the 
“Space Race”, culminated in the landing of US astronauts 
on the moon in 1969. However, access to space has be-
come fundamentally less exclusive over the comparatively 
short period of the past 20 years: Today, at least twelve 
states and several companies have emerged as space-
faring entities. Moreover, while the military dimension 
was a key driver of space activities during the Cold War, 
commercial activities today shape a sizable part of the 
industry. In fact, about 60 percent of payloads launched 
into space in 2017 were commercial in nature.5
Technological innovation in computing, manufactur-
ing, miniaturization, and launch-related technologies, as 
well as their proliferation have opened space for more 
states and a whole range of new actors, from commercial 
industries to universities interested in space research. 
Furthermore, the increased military and economic value 
of space, and the efforts to reap and protect this value will 
likely lead to an increased proliferation of space-related 
technologies. More states will either indigenously develop 
such technologies or procure them on the market, and 
thereby further accelerate the opening of space.
The Civil-Military Importance of Space Assets
Civilian and military activities increasingly involve, or 
even depend on outer space. Satellites enable naviga-
tion and the transfer of vast amounts of data. They have 
become critical to controlling military assets, such as 
uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs). Thus, space assets are 
enablers and multipliers of military force. They provide 
vital information for both, nuclear and conventional forc-
es. In the civilian domain, commercial satellites provide 
many services, from communication and observation to 
remote sensing and navigation, and even time-stamping 
money transfers. Moreover, the civil-military ambiguity 
of assets is growing as commercial suppliers also offer 
their services (e.g. bandwidth on communication satel-
lites) to armed forces, thereby complicating the distinc-
tion between military and civilian targets.
The Growing Importance of Space Triggers 
Anti-Satellite Weapon Development 
The growing dependence of civilian and military activi-
ties on space assets increases the strategic value of space 
for a rising number of actors, both state and non-state. 
This, in turn, spurs considerations and investments into 
the security and defense of space assets. The proliferation 
of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons is one consequence of 
this development.
Space assets have, from their earliest days, played a key 
role in the military. Since the 1960s, they have provided 
several critical capabilities related to nuclear warfare to 
both superpowers, including weather forecasting, target-
ing, early warning, assessing damage and maintaining 
command and control. The ability to detect a nuclear first 
strike and respond to it with a second- or counterstrike was 
essential to the strategic balance of the Cold War, as it es-
tablished the so-called Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). 
At the same time, both superpowers came to understand 
that space assets are vulnerable, after testing ASAT 
weapons and especially after conducting nuclear tests in 
the upper atmosphere. The combined vulnerability and im-
portance of space assets for the strategic-nuclear balance 
between the USA and the Soviet Union led both states to 
abstain from deploying ASAT capabilities on a large scale, 
though both developed and tested such systems.
Since then, the military relevance of space has diversi-
fied: The Second Gulf War in 1991 demonstrated to the 
involved militaries and to outside observers the added 
value of space assets for conventional military operations 
in the form of intelligence, navigation, communications, 
and munition guidance. Today, the destruction of an 
adversaries’ space assets would not only affect its nuclear 
second-strike capabilities, but also decrease the effective-
ness of a wide range of conventional military assets.
This boosts the incentive for countries to develop their 
space assets, for which the navigation satellite constella-
tions of the EU (Galileo), Russia (GLONASS) and China 
(Beidou) are examples. At the same time, it incentivizes 
the development of ASAT capabilities that can be used 
either to threaten the space assets of an adversary and 
thereby diminish his military effectiveness via a first 
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strike, or to deter another actor by threatening to destroy 
his respective space assets.
Three basic types of ASAT capabilities can threaten 
space assets: These are kinetic weapons (e.g. missiles), 
non-kinetic weapons (especially directed energy beams), 
and capabilities which interfere with the electronic 
spectrum or digital components of space infrastructure, 
e.g., through cyberattacks or electronic warfare. These 
three types of weapons can be stationed in space, on the 
ground, or in the cyberspace / electromagnetic spectrum. 
Today, several states have such ASAT capabilities, above 
all, the USA, China, Russia, and India. Moreover, some 
countries field weapon systems that can be used to en-
gage satellites (e.g. Israel), and others have the industrial 
capabilities and experience to develop and use them in 
the foreseeable future (e.g. European states and Japan). 
Thus, it is reasonable to expect more actors with ASAT ca-
pabilities in the future. This is likely to render the security 
situation of space assets more complex, since, for instance, 
deterrence measures will have to be designed to discour-
age more potential adversaries from attacks.
Anti-Satellite Capabilities and their Strategic 
Implications 
The specific characteristics of space assets determine stra-
tegic calculations about space: Such assets are vulnerable; 
strikes against them are difficult to deter; the information 
they provide has an ambiguous impact on crisis stability, 
and they favor smaller actors. All these characteristics 
can have detrimental impacts on the strategic and crisis 
stability among states.
The Vulnerability of Space Assets Decreases Crisis 
Stability
Both, the vulnerability and the importance of space assets 
for military operations incentivize first-strike strategies 
that are designed to destroy an adversaries’ space assets 
at the onset of a conflict and, thereby, decrease his other 
military capabilities. The actors know about the vulnera-
bility of their space assets and are, therefore, particularly 
vigilant. This vigilance decreases crisis stability, which 
describes the balance of incentives for the involved actors 
to either de-escalate or further escalate a crisis.
Intricate Deterrence due to the Problems of  
Attribution and Time Compression
Deterrence is difficult to achieve for space assets, as they 
are so fragile that none would survive a well-coordinated 
first strike against them. They are classic “use-it-or-lose-it” 
assets, and this aspect further decreases crisis stability. 
Only a massive deployment of ground-based ASAT capa-
bilities, that would enable a retaliatory strike so that both 
actors would lose their space assets, might counter-bal-
ance this to a certain degree, as it allows for a so-called 
deterrence by punishment.
However, even a (misinterpreted) threat to space as-
sets could start a chain reaction and quickly escalate an 
incident in space to a wider war. Successful deterrence, 
therefore, requires situational awareness, attribution 
capabilities and resilient assets. Especially the latter two 
are notoriously difficult to achieve in space. While it might 
be easy to attribute a kinetic attack executed with a missile, 
the same is not true for ASAT attacks by other satellites, 
and, especially, not for cyberattacks and electronic warfare 
measures. Without clear attribution, however, it is difficult 
to deter any adversary, since he could speculate that an at-
tack cannot be traced back to him – making deterrence and 
retaliation more difficult. Although cross-domain deter-
rence, i.e. threatening an actor through potential retalia-
tion attacks on or by other-than-space assets, is always pos-
sible, it also amplifies the problems involved in traditional 
deterrence: A response has to be timely and proportionate, 
and it should not further expand of the conflict.
Furthermore, most timeframes for a potential escala-
tion in space are measured in minutes, or even less for di-
rected-energy and certain space-based ASAT weapons. As 
a result, both, decision-making processes and the humans 
deciding on military activities in space (e.g. a counterat-
tack), are subject to very significant time compression. 
This also decreases crisis stability since it might further 
encourage an aggressive first-strike behavior prompted by 
the desire not to lose valuable assets.
The Ambiguous Influence of Information on 
Stability
The primary mission of most space assets is collecting 
and distributing information, and, as a result of this, 
crisis stability can be impacted in ambiguous ways. In-
formation from space assets is key to four core security 
activities, which make it likely that a conflict in space 
and the loss of space assets will immediately spill over 
into other domains:
First, information is vital for the conduct of conven-
tional military operations. Over the past three decades, 
Western and especially US armed forces have become 
dependent on information provided by space assets. Ab-
sence of space assets and their information would revert 
warfare to pre-space information conditions, and thereby 
make the movement of forces and communication among 
them more difficult. A more complicated movement and 
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sustainment of forces, again, would make conventional 
and expeditionary operations alike more demanding.
Second, military early warning and intelligence are 
crucial for nuclear forces and second-strike capabilities. 
They helped to stabilize the strategic balance during the 
Cold War. As a result, attacks against space assets per-
forming such early-warning and intelligence tasks were 
considered too dangerous. It was presumed that such an 
attack would lead an adversary to assume the worst-case-
scenario, i.e. an all-out nuclear attack, and then favor an 
equally destructive response. At least for Russia and the 
US, this is still valid today. 
Third, an outage of intelligence space assets would 
decrease the quality of intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance, and, as a result, prompt a higher alert for 
conventional forces, since troop movements or military 
build-ups by an adversary could more easily go unnoticed.
Finally, space assets are used for the technical verifica-
tion of compliance with international non-proliferation, 
arms control and disarmament regimes as well as em-
bargos. Losing any space assets needed for these matters 
would also decrease a state’s ability to check whether 
other agreement parties are, in fact, compliant. This un-
certainty would increase the chance for misinterpretation 
and miscalculations, thereby undermine trust between 
countries, and decrease crisis stability.
More information can, thus, help adversaries to defuse 
tensions. From this viewpoint, more information, and 
the provision of the space assets required to garner such 
information must be regarded as conducive to stability. 
With easier access to space and more space-faring states, 
strategic stability might therefore increase. 
However, space assets can also decrease crisis stability 
as they are prone to technical glitches. This was, for in-
stance, obvious during the Cold War, when early-warning 
satellites misinterpreted light reflected from clouds as 
missile launches. Such misinterpretations nearly led to 
nuclear exchanges on multiple occasions.
Inherent Asymmetries Favor Small Actors
Given the vulnerability of space assets and their high val-
ue for the militaries which use them, the use of compara-
tively cheap ASAT weapons (especially in cyberattacks) 
can have disproportionally huge returns on investment. 
This is especially important for small actors who seek to 
attack or disrupt an adversary’s military effectiveness and 
efficiency if it is based on space assets. By contrast, even a 
few space assets can bring significant benefits in the form 
of new intelligence information for any state, and this 
aspect is favorable especially to smaller actors provided 
they can afford the necessary resources. Consequently, 
these actors might profit massively from the easing of ac-
cess to space that commercial innovation is bringing. This 
development, in turn, forces other space actors to review 
their thoughts about space security and consider more 
actors, which complicates the picture significantly.
Possible Options for the Protection of Space  
Assets in a Changing Security Environment
Actors seeking to protect their space assets can choose 
among four, possibly also combined, major options: 
 . They can opt for a more aggressive force posture and 
even field new ASAT systems that enable a first strike. 
Such activities will most probably further reduce sta-
bility, especially, if they take place in space. This is due 
to the time compression for decision making.
 . Actors can start duplicating essential space assets, i.e. 
deploy more satellites which perform the same func-
tions. However, this is bound to lead to growing num-
bers of ASAT capabilities to keep pace with a growing 
number of targets: If one actor increases redundancies 
or strike capabilities, others are likely to follow.
 . Actors could also reduce the role of space in their com-
mercial and military activities. However, this would 
require substantial investments in the development 
of substitute systems. In view of a possible conflict in 
space, the nations less dependent on space assets are 
less vulnerable today.
 . A final option would be to use many methods and 
technologies, like hardening, anti-jamming, or decep-
tion to develop and field a new generation of defensive 
or protected space assets, yet this would also require 
significant investments.
The vulnerability of space assets, the difficulty of 
deterrence and the inherent advantages for smaller ac-
tors regarding space assets all decrease the strategic and 
crisis stability among states with either space or ASAT 
capabilities. At the same time, effective countermeasures 
would require serious investments into the research and 
development, production and deployment of more resil-
ient space assets. As a result, measures to retain stability 
are key in order to limit the risk of conflict or even war in 
space.
Existing Space Governance Instruments Fail to 
Ensure Stability
Unfortunately, space governance in the form of trea-
ties, institutions, and initiatives has not yet managed 
to keep up with the various developments. The exist-
ing international conventions were developed during 
the Cold War and for a different framework, that was 
dominated by two space-faring superpowers and did 
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not experience the interference of private actors. Recent 
initiatives to regulate space activity and prevent the 
weaponization of space have not yet yielded any results: 
Among them are the “International Code of Conduct for 
Outer Space Activities” (ICoC), brought forward by the 
European Union, the group of governmental experts 
(GGE) to study potential trust and confidence-building 
measures for outer-space activities, or the “Treaty on the 
Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, 
the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects” 
(PPWT), promoted by China and Russia. However, the 
former two lack a binding nature and thus entail a high 
risk of infringement. The latter, again, only covers 
clearly identifiable space-based ASAT weapons, such as 
missiles, guns or lasers, but does not address other ASAT 
capabilities, such as ground-based systems, cyberattacks 
or so-called suicide satellites in space.
Moreover, other arms control regimes are also unpre-
pared to assure stability in space. Existing arms control 
treaties barely prohibit or even regulate the military 
capabilities and the equipment that are required for ASAT 
capabilities. With the demise of the “Anti-Ballistic Mis-
sile Treaty” (ABMT) in 2002, this coverage shrunk even 
further and is now limited to only one treaty, the 1963 
“Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty” (PTBT), which prohibits 
nuclear explosions in outer space. As a result, new arms 
control efforts are necessary to decrease the probability 
that conflicts, or strategic and military competition will 
spill over into the space domain.
Existing non-proliferation treaties, foremost the “Mis-
sile Technology Control Regime” (MTCR) and the Was-
senaar Arrangement (WA), are quite capable of limiting 
the proliferation of critical technologies and systems re-
quired for ASAT capabilities. However, they would need to 
include more states, especially emerging economies with 
ambitious military and space-related plans, i.e. China and 
India. Joined by more countries, existing non-prolifera-
tion agreements could provide enough barriers to at least 
slow the rapid proliferation of ASAT-related technologies 
– with the notable exception of cyber capabilities.
Tasks and Challenges for NATO and Germany
Promoting Strategic Stability and the Civilian Use 
of Space
Germany and NATO have a high interest in keeping space 
a peaceful domain and, therefore, in ensuring the current 
strategic stability as well as the use of space for civilian 
purposes. Furthermore, the destruction of their space as-
sets would severely limit Germany’s and NATO’s military 
capabilities, as these depend on space assets for early 
warning, intelligence, communication, and navigation. 
Since no European country fields ASAT weapons, stabil-
ity through deterrence could be achieved in the form of 
highly complex cross-domain deterrence, a total depen-
dence on US ASAT capabilities, or the use of other diplo-
matic instruments like arms control and non-proliferation 
regimes.
New arms control regimes for ASAT capabilities have 
proven elusive during the past decades. One option for 
Germany is to continue to focus on non-binding codes of 
conduct, as it does together with the EU. This will keep 
the international debate on space norms going and create 
non-binding behavioral norms for space use, even though 
their security-enhancing effect would be limited due to 
the lack of verification mechanisms. Germany should 
also consider joining efforts to prohibit the stationing of 
weapon systems in space (e.g. the “Sino-Russian Treaty 
on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer 
Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Ob-
jects” (PPWT)), even if such efforts today do not include 
ground-based ASAT weapons or cyber and electronic 
warfare capabilities. Nevertheless, space-based weapons 
are the most destabilizing type, while ground-based ASAT 
capabilities can provide an – albeit limited – stabilizing 
second-strike capability and, thereby, deterrence against 
an adversary’s space assets, in case a conflict escalates. 
Finally, Germany should work toward the inclusion of 
more states into the existing non-proliferation treaties, 
especially the MTCR and WA. While the militarization of 
space is bound to continue and can even have stabilizing 
effects on global strategic stability, the weaponization of 
space would likely initiate a destabilizing arms race.
Such an arms race and the resulting instability increase 
the risk of escalation. Escalation of any conflict in space 
entails the danger of rendering space unusable for human-
kind for a long time. By far the most dangerous current 
threat to space assets is human-made debris. Besides the 
intentional destruction of space assets (e.g. to test indig-
enous anti-satellite capabilities) and collisions of inactive 
satellites, any increased activity in spaceflight inevitably 
increases the number of objects – mostly debris – orbiting 
Earth. It is estimated that debris has increased by 50 per-
cent in just the past five years.6 In the worst-case scenario, 
spaceflight and the use of space assets would become im-
possible due to the amount of debris that is orbiting earth, 
continually colliding and creating additional debris in a 
cascade also known as the “Kessler syndrome”.
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While Also Preparing for the Worst by 
Strengthening NATO’s Role in Space
Given the importance of space assets for Western military 
and civilian operations, and the risk of negotiation fail-
ures in arms control initiatives, Germany should, however, 
also support NATO considerations to designate space 
as a military-operational domain of its own, set apart 
from land, air, sea and cyberspace. A domain describes a 
“critical macro maneuver space whose access or control is 
vital to the freedom of action and superiority required by 
the mission”.7 Designating space as such a domain would 
prompt NATO more closely to analyze its vulnerabilities 
in space and its dependence on both civilian and military 
space-based assets. This would increase NATO’s under-
standing of the entanglement of space and non-space 
operations and facilitate considerations about deterrence 
and defense in space.
NATO member states will also have to answer two 
crucial questions for the alliance: Does an attack on the 
space asset of one ally constitutes an Article 5 incident? 
And will national space assets come under the command 
of NATO in case of an attack?
NATO’s position on cyberattacks might serve as an ex-
ample for integrating space into the Article 5-framework, 
especially given the fact that cyber- and electronic attacks 
on space assets are the most likely ones. NATO has so 
far kept the threshold for triggering Article 5 consciously 
vague in cyberspace, ultimately leaving it to the North 
Atlantic Council to decide whether to count an attack as 
an Article 5 event. A similar approach could be taken to 
cover non-physical attacks on space assets, while physical 
attacks could be covered by Article 4 of the North Atlan-
tic Treaty, which states that allies can “consult together 
whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial 
integrity, political independence or security of any of 
the Parties is threatened“.8 In the case of cyberspace, the 
alliance designated cyberattacks as a possible trigger for 
Article 5, even before it designated cyberspace as its own 
military-operational domain.9 Given the close integration 
of most space and other military assets, it would further 
make sense for NATO members to subordinate their space 
assets to NATO supreme command in case of an attack on 
the alliance, just as with other military capabilities.
Declaring space as a domain would align NATO with 
some of its major members in this regard, since the USA10, 
the UK11, France12 and Germany13 all list space as an 
operational domain beside land, air, sea, and cyberspace. 
While NATO allies hold largely identical threat percep-
tions about the changing security environment in space, 
disagreements might arise over the importance of space 
and the re-allocation of resources (i.e. funds and person-
nel) toward developing NATO’s instruments, structures, 
and capabilities in a future space domain. Furthermore, 
the debate about subordinating national space assets will, 
most likely, see diverging opinions within the alliance, 
especially by states with a high interest in retaining their 
strategic autonomy. Moreover, allies might disagree over 
the central question of whether to weaponize space – that 
is, to station offensive weapons in orbit –, or whether to 
pursue other instruments to increase their resilience, 
such as arms control regimes or more passive reactions 
like the duplication of space assets. Consequently, Ger-
many should facilitate the political debate within the alli-
ance about these open questions and potential challenges. 
As the scheduled NATO summit in London on December 
3-4, 2019 will address “current and emerging security 
challenges”,14 space might become an important topic. It 
also has the potential to further deepen NATO’s internal 
rifts if it is not properly addressed.
Finally, Germany should take the lead in more practi-
cal steps, e.g. in aligning the thinking and procedures 
in the alliance. This could be achieved, for example, by 
further strengthening the NATO Center of Excellence 
which deals with space-related issues, the Joint Air Power 
Competence Centre (JAPCC) in Kalkar. Strengthening 
NATO’s space posture in general would be in the interest 
of Germany, also given that it is home to NATO’s Allied 
Air Command in Ramstein, which would become even 
more important in the alliance’s headquarter structure.
Torben Schütz is Associate Fellow in the Security, De-
fense, and Armaments program of the German Council on 
Foreign Relations (DGAP).
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